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COMMENTS
CORPORATE HEALTH INSURANCE INC. v.
THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE:
IS THE TEXAS ACT HOLDING HMOs
LIABLE FOR SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL
CARE PREEMPTED BY ERISA?
FRANCINE S. ADLER*
Health care delivery in the United States has changed
significantly over the past few decades.' Specifically, public
concern over soaring medical costs and financially-driven
diagnostic and treatment decisions have led physicians to
provide medical care as members of health maintenance
organizations (HMOs)2 instead of as sole practitioners under the
traditional fee-for-service method.3 In fact, HMOs have become
* J.D Candidate, June 2000, St. John's University School of Law; D.P.M., New
York College of Podiatric Medicine; A.B., Washington University in St. Louis.
1 See Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, The "Shared Risk" of Potential Tort Liability
of Health Maintenance Organizations and the Defense of ERISA Preemption, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 855, 858-59 (1998) (stating that health maintenance organizations
became the prevalent mode of health care delivery for Americans in the 1980s).
2 See Michael Kanute, Comment, Evolving Theories of Malpractice Liability for
HMOs, 20 LOY. U. CI. L.J. 841, 841 (1989) (defining HMOs as "an alternative
system of health care delivery, whereby health care providers... enter into
contracts with or are employed by a health care entity to provide comprehensive
health care to voluntarily enrolled patients") (footnote omitted); id. at 841-42
(noting that the main trait of an HMO is that the "patient pays a prepaid, fixed fee
for medical services... without regard to the actual amount of services provided").
3 See MacDougall, supra note 1, at 860 (explaining that physicians receiving
fees under the traditional method are compensated solely for the care they provide,
creating an economic incentive to perform unnecessary medical procedures); Greg
Otterson, Comment, Medical Malpractice for Texas HMOs: The End of a "Charmed
Life?", 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 799, 800 (1998) (noting that subscribers to IMOs receive
health care for lower prepaid fees than if they paid for the care at the time it was
needed); Amy Stoeckl, Comment, Refusing to Follow Doctor's Orders: Texas Takes
the First Step in Holding HMOs Liable for Bad Medical Decisions, 18 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 387, 389 (1998) (noting that, in order to reduce medical costs, employers and
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the most common mode of health care delivery among both the
general public and employers providing health insurance
benefits to employees. 4
Prior to 1974, employee health plans were regulated by a
combination of common law and state and federal legislation.5
In order to standardize the administration of these plans and to
protect employees, Congress enacted the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).6 ERISA's
preemption clause, section 514(a),7 illustrates Congress's intent
that employee health benefit plans function without state
interference. 8 It is important to note, however, that in 1974,
managed health care did not exist as it does today. Congress
could not then foresee the use of ERISA by managed care
organizations as a defense to liability and a shield for HMOs.9
Congress never intended to harm employees by preventing them
from bringing tort actions against HMOs associated with ERISA
health plans. 10
Litigation involving HMOs and their participating
insurance companies seek managed care entities to provide medical care for their
members and employees rather than traditional fee for service physicians); Scott
Thornton, Comment, The Texas Health Care Liability Act: Managed Care
Organizations Can Say Goodbye to Their Extensive Immunity from Lawsuits-Or at
Least That Was How It Was Supposed to Work, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1227, 1232
(1999) (explaining that the managed care system grew in response to skyrocketing
costs under the fee-for-service method).
4 See Jose L. Gonzalez, A Managed Care Organization's Medical Malpractice
Liability for Denial of Care: The Lost World, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 715, 729 (1998)
(noting that there was a "veritable explosion" in the popularity of HMOs in the mid-
to late 1980s); Otterson, supra note 3, at 800 (stating that the increase in medical
costs has made HMOs attractive to many employers interested in providing low-cost
health insurance benefits to employees); Stoeckl, supra note 3, at 389 (noting that
approximately 150 million Americans participate in HMOs or managed care
entities).
5 See Otterson, supra note 3, at 809 (noting that pre-ERISA employee benefit
plans "were governed primarily by state laws, common law, federal statutes, and
the Taft-Hartley Act").
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
7 See id. at § 1144(a).
8 See id. (stating that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
9 See Dawn Lauren Morris, Comment, ERISA Preemption, HMOs, and Denial
of Benefit Claims, 59 LA. L. REv. 961, 997-99 (1999) (discussing Congress's intent in
the enactment of ERISA and the interplay between HMOs and employees regarding
liability under traditional tort theories versus preemption under ERISA).
10 See id. at 999 (explaining issues surrounding ERISA preemption).
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physicians has increased over the past few years.1 ' Physicians
have been held personally liable for negligent acts leading to
patient injuries.12 An issue remains, however, as to whether
HIOs themselves can escape the liability imposed by state law.
The HMOs argue that state laws holding them liable for the
negligent acts of their member physicians "relate to" employee
benefit plans and are therefore preempted by section 514(a) of
ERISA. 13
In 1997, in response to the issue of preempted tort liability,
the state of Texas passed the Texas Health Care Liability Act
(the "Act"),14 making it the first state to impose liability on
HMOs for substandard health care. 15 In Corporate Health
Insurance Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance,16 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that
ERISA does not preempt the sections of the Act that impose
liability on HiMOs for treatment decisions. 17 The court also held,
however, that provisions of the Act that establish an
independent review process for adverse benefit determinations
are preempted by ERISA. 18
In Corporate Health Insurance, Corporate Health Insurance
Inc., AEtna Health Plans of Texas, Inc., AEtna Health Plans of
North Texas, Inc., and AEtna Life Insurance Co. ("Plaintiffs")
sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the
Commissioner of the Texas Department of Insurance, the
Attorney General of the State of Texas, and the Texas
Department of Insurance ("Defendants").19 Plaintiffs requested
a declaration that specific sections of the Act 20 were preempted
11 See MacDougall, supra note 1, at 856 (stating that litigants seeking
compensation for personal injuries from HMO physicians often include the HMO as
a party).
12 See id. at 868 (noting that the controversy over an HMO's liability for a
physician's negligence does not affect the physician's personal liability); Stoeckl,
supra note 3, at 390 (noting that when physicians provide substandard medical
care, they are held liable under tort law for injuries caused by their treatment).
13 See MacDougall, supra note 1, at 898 (stating that the question of whether a
state law is preempted by ERISA is among the most litigated issues involving
employee health benefit plans).
14 See TEX- Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (West Supp. 2000).
15 See Otterson, supra note 3, at 821.
16 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
17 See id. at 620.
18 See id. at 625.
19 See id. at 602.
20 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (West Supp. 2000).
20001
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
by ERISA, as well as an injunction preventing enforcement of
the Act against ERISA-protected employee benefit plans. 21
Plaintiffs challenged the portions of the Act that: (1) allowed
individuals to sue HMOs and managed care entities for their
"failure to exercise ordinary care" in medical decisions;22 (2) held
HMOs "liable for substandard... treatment decisions made by
their employees [or] agents";23  and (3) "establishe[d] an
independent review process [to examine] adverse
benefit determinations."24
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court
converted into a motion for summary judgment. 25 Illuminating
the difference between ERISA and the Act, Defendants reasoned
that ERISA controlled the type of regulation that may be
imposed on employee benefit plans, while the Act regulated the
quality of medical care provided by HMOs. 26 Therefore, they
argued, ERISA's preemption clause did not apply to the Act,27
and HMOs could not avoid liability for their substandard
medical decisions.28  Alternatively, Defendants requested
severance of any provisions of the Act that were determined to be
preempted in order to preserve the "quality of care
liability provisions."29
Plaintiffs', in their motion for summary judgment, argued
that the Act interfered with the purpose of ERISA30 by "injecting
state law into an area exclusively reserved for Congress."31
Plaintiffs asserted that "the Act... 'refer[red] to'... and...
ha[d] a connection with ERISA plans"32 in that the Act
attempted to apply state law to the structure and administration
of employee health benefit plans.33
21 See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
22 Id. at 602.
23 Id.
?A Id. at 602-03.
25 See id. at 603.
26 See id. Defendants further argued that the Act does not govern how HMOs
determine benefits nor how benefit plans should be structured. See id.
27 See id.
28 See id. Defendants looked to the plain meaning of the statute to determine
the purpose of the Act, which was to deter HMOs from avoiding liability for
"medical decisions [that] they 'make,' 'control' or 'influence.' "Id.
29 Id.
3o See id.
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The court granted in part 34 Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the issue of whether ERISA preempts the Act's
provisions holding HMOs liable for negligent and substandard
care.35 The court, however, also granted in part 6 Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether ERISA
preempts the Act's establishment of independent reviews for
adverse benefit determinations.37
District Judge Gilmore explained that in order to determine
whether the Act was preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA, the
court had to decide if the state law was " 'relate[d] to any
employee benefit plan"'" covered by ERISA.38 Relying on CIGNA
Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. State of Louisiana,39 the court
concluded that the Act "relates to" an ERISA plan if the Act or
potential claims to be brought under the Act are "connect[ed]
with" or "refer[] to" an ERISA plan.40
The court first utilized the test applied by the Fifth Circuit
in Meredith v. Time Insurance Co.41 to determine whether the
health plans involved in the suit were employee benefit plans
covered by ERISA. The Meredith test asks "whether a plan: (1)
exists; (2) falls within the safe-harbor provision established by
the Department of Labor; and (3) satisfies the primary elements
of an ERISA 'employee benefit plan'-establishment or
maintenance by an employer intending to benefit employees."42
Agreeing with Defendants, the court found that AEtna offered
health care benefits to employees who were ERISA plan
members.43 The court determined, however, that AEtna's health
plan did not qualify as an employee benefit plan under ERISA44
because it functioned as a health plan, not as an employer-
established ERISA plan.45
34 See id. at 602.
35 See id. at 620.
36 See id. at 602.
37 See id. at 625.
38 Id. at 607 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)).
39 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
40 Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
41 980 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1993).
42 Id. at 355.
43 See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
4See id.
45 See id. The plans provided by AEtna failed the third prong of the test
because they were not created or maintained by an employer. See id. AEtna agreed
that they were managed care entities and therefore did not involve " 'an employer
2000]
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Nevertheless, relying on CIGNA, the court concluded that
whether Aetna was not an ERISA health plan was immaterial to
determining whether the Act was preempted by ERISA.46 The
court therefore turned its attention to precedent 47  and
Congressional intent48 to determine whether the Texas Act
"related to," and was therefore preempted by, ERISA. 49 ERISA
was initially enacted in order to ensure uniformity in the
administration of employee benefit plans,50 not to " 'supplant
state law.' "-51 The court therefore concluded that Plaintiffs had
the "'considerable burden' " of rebutting the presumption that
Congress did not intend to bypass state law when enacting the
ERISA statute.52
Finally, the court analyzed the Act to determine whether it,
in any way, "refer[red] to" an ERISA program. 53 The court found
that the Texas Act regulated the quality of care provided by
HMOs and managed care entities without regard to whether
those providers were associated with an ERISA plan. Therefore,
the court concluded that the Act did not "make any reference to
ERISA plans."54 This conclusion was based on New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
purchasing coverage or acting on behalf of its employees' " Id. (quoting TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(8) (West Supp. 2000)).
46 See id. at 610. The court in CIGNA decided whether a Louisiana statute was
preempted by ERISA without determining whether CIGNA was an ERISA plan
provider. See CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 648
(5th Cir. 1996). As long as some provisions of the Act "relate to" ERISA employee
benefit plans, it does not matter whether plaintiffs were ERISA employee benefit
providers. See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
47 See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 610-11. The court referred to
CIGNA, stating that a state law is considered to relate to ERISA even if it only
indirectly affects an employee benefit plan, and therefore will be preempted in cases
where the law applies to an employee plan. See id. at 610.
48 See id. at 611. The court relied on the Supreme Court's "pragmatic approach"
in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-57 (1995), to determine whether a state law
"relates to" an ERISA plan. See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 611. The
Court in Travelers analyzed a state statute by looking to Congress' intent when
enacting ERISA rather than trying to define "relates to" by looking at the language
in section 514(a) of ERISA. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
49 See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 610-11.
50 See id. at 611.
51 Id. (quoting DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund, 520
U.S. 806, 814 (1997)).
52 Id. (quoting DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 814).
53 See id. at 611-14.
54 Id. at 612.
[74:209214
HMO LIABILITYAND ERISA PREEMPTION
Insurance Co.55 and on language in the Act "exclud[ing] ERISA
plans from the definition of a 'managed care entity.'" 56
Although the Act did not "refer to" an ERISA plan, "[a] law
that does not refer to ERISA plans may yet be pre-empted if it
has a 'connection with' ERISA plans."57 In determining whether
the Act had a "connection with" an ERISA plan, the court
focused its analysis on whether the Act inappropriately
interjected state law liability into federally-regulated ERISA
entities;58 improperly governed the administration and structure
of the benefit plans;59 improperly bound "employers or plan
administrators to particular choices;"60 or erroneously created a
substitute enforcement mode.61
In determining whether the Act imposed state liability on a
federally-reserved area, the court, relying on Dukes v. United
States Healthcare, Inc.,62 concluded that the Act regulated the
quality of medical care provided by a health plan provider, but
did not involve the determination of benefits and was therefore
not connected with ERISA.63 Accordingly, the Act was not
5 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
6 Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 88.001(8) (West Supp. 2000)). The district court in Corporate Health
Insurance noted that the Supreme Court in Travelers held that a statute did not
"refer[] to" an ERISA plan if surcharges mandated by the plan were imposed
without regard to whether the health plan was associated with or regarded as an
ERISA plan. Id. (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656). The Corporate Health Insurance
court further held that, because the Act specifically omitted ERISA plans from the
definition of" 'managed care entity,' " the Act could not "make any reference to"
ERISA plans. Id.
57 California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997).
-8 See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 614-20.
69 See id. at 621-26.
60 Id. at 626-27.
61 See id. at 628-29.
62 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995). The Corporate Health Insurance court felt that
the claims in Dukes were "more akin to" those of the Corporate Health Insurance
plaintiffs than were the issues in Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321 (5th Cir. 1992) and Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Texas, Inc., 980 F.2d 1014 (5th
Cir. 1993). Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 618. Rodriguez was
distinguishable because in that case the plaintiff was unable to "challenge the
quality of [the] benefits actually received" from his HMO. Id. Corcoran differed from
Corporate Health Insurance in that Corcoran involved the denial of benefits, not the
quality of benefits actually provided. See id. at 617.
0 See id. at 620.
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preempted by ERISA and did not improperly impose state
liability.64
Lastly, the court analyzed the section of the Act mandating
an independent review process for adverse benefit
determinations 65 to determine if that provision was preempted
by ERISA.66 The court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's rationale in Travelers67 in determining that the
imposition of independent reviews improperly interfered with
the administration of employee benefit plans.68 There was thus
a connection between the provisions for independent review and
ERISA plans, triggering ERISA's preemption clause.69 Under
Texas law, however, this section could be severed from the Act,
leaving the non-preempted sections of the statute intact
and enforceable. 70
The Corporate Health Insurance court correctly ruled that
the sections of the Act holding HMOs liable for negligent and
substandard medical decisions were not preempted by ERISA.
The court, however, misconstrued the section of the Act
providing for independent reviews of adverse benefit
determinations. The court should have acknowledged that,
although these reviews are connected with the administration of
ERISA plans, they are so closely tied to the provision of quality
care by HIOs that preemption is improper. The denial of
benefits can result in the denial of treatment, which can be
detrimental and sometimes fatal. This Comment asserts that
preemption decisions relating to this section of the Act should
instead be made on a case-by-case basis.
Part I of this Comment explains that, although ERISA
6 See id.
65 See id. at 624 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.58C (West Supp. 2000)).
66 See id. at 624-25.
67 See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
68 See Corporate Health Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26.
69 See id. at 625.
70 See id. at 625-26. The court looked to the Texas Code Construction Act,
which provides in pertinent part:
In a statute that does not contain a provision for severability or
nonseverability, if any provision of the statute ... is held invalid, the
invalidity does not affect other provisions ... of the statute that can be
given effect without the invalid provision... and to this end the provisions
of the statute are severable.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.032(c) (West 1998).
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preempts state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans,
courts are divided when deciding which state negligence causes
of action "relate to" the plans and are therefore preempted by
ERISA. Part II asserts that the Texas Act could have a profound
impact in Texas, where the first case has already been brought
under the Act, as well as in other jurisdictions where similar
statutes are being contemplated to finally hold HIOs liable for
negligent medical care. This Comment concludes that the
Corporate Health Insurance court incorrectly held that
independent reviews for adverse benefit determinations were
preempted by ERISA. It stresses that future courts and
legislatures should address the ambiguity of the "relates to"
language in the ERISA statute. Further, courts and legislatures
should recognize that, although denials of medical benefits in
ERISA plans "relate to" the administration of ERISA plans, the
denials themselves should be considered substandard health
care. In order to ensure that HMOs deliver quality health care,
it is imperative that state laws governing medical benefit denials
are not preempted.
I. ERISA PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
A. Preempted State Tort Claims
Unfortunately, Congress did not specify how far it intended
ERISA's preemption to extend into the area of negligent
managed care.71  When ERISA's "relates to" language is
71 See Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 771 (suggesting that the purpose of federal
preemption was to miniTize the burden on employee benefit plans that would
otherwise have to comply with a conflicting array of state regulations); Suzanne M.
Grosso, Rethinking Malpractice Liability and ERISA Preemption in the Age of
Managed Care, 9 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 433, 441 (1998) (explaining that although
the statutory language of ERISA provides that ERISA" 'shall supersede any and all
State laws... as they may... relate to any employee benefit plan,' " it does not
clearly guide courts in determining how far Congress intended this language to
extend) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)); MacDougall, supra note 1, at 901
(stating that Congress's intent is unclear as to whether ERISA was to preempt all
state tort law claims and that" '[there is no indication in the language of ERISA's
preemption clause, or in ERISA's legislative history, that employers and benefit
plans were to obtain some self-promoting protection from state law obligations' ")
(quoting Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care
Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355,
360 (1994)); Stoeckl, supra note 3, at 398-99 (stating that ERISA's complexity
makes it very difficult to predict which claims will be preempted, and therefore a
great deal of latitude is given when making this decision).
20001
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interpreted broadly, HMOs are relieved from tort liability.72
Courts preempt claims when resolution involves the
interpretation of a health plan.73 Furthermore, courts tend to
preempt all claims involving the quantity of care provided by
HMOs, including claims attempting to impose liability on HMOs
and managed care entities for negligent administration of
employee benefits and for the negligent denial of benefits. 74 An
example of such a case is Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.,75
in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that ERISA preemption was appropriate for a tort claim
brought by a woman against a utilization review company for
denial of nursing care benefits leading to the unnecessary death
of her unborn fetus.76 The Fifth Circuit's broad interpretation of
the ERISA preemption clause suggests that state tort suits may
be preempted if the lawsuits in any way disturb or regulate the
administration of benefits, without regard to whether the
administration of benefits leads to substandard health
care decisions. 77
72 See MacDougall, supra note 1, at 902 (noting that federal district courts that
interpret ERISA broadly have preempted causes of action against HMOs).
73 See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a claim for
an injury that neither arose from the administration of a health plan nor required a
resolution based on the interpretation of the plan should not be preempted by
ERISA); see also Angela M. Easley, Comment, A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA
Preemption of HMO Medical Malpractice Claims: The Dissatisfactory Distinction
Between Quality and Quantity of Care, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 293, 302-03 (1997)
(stating that quantity of care decisions that involve referencing of plans "to
determine what was promised" under the plan should be preempted).
74 See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding that direct liability claims against HMOs are preempted by
ERISA); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the improper denial of authorization of benefits "relate[s] to" ERISA and is
therefore preempted); Spain v. AEtna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a wrongful death suit brought under state law and seeking damages
for negligent handling of benefit claim was preempted by ERISA); Kuhl v. Lincoln
Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 304 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
that claims for delays in allowing a surgical procedure by an insurer were
preempted by ERISA); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a tort claim for wrongful death of a child was
preempted by ERISA); Danca v. Emerson Hosp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. Mass. 1998)
(holding that ERISA preempted a state law claim for improper denial of benefits
that led to attempted suicide).
7 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
76 See id. at 1330 (holding that decisions regarding the availability of benefits
under an ERISA plan are preempted by the ERISA statute).
77 See Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 779 (noting that not only will tort claims be
preempted if they interfere with benefits of health care plans, but also if they
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When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, managed care was
not nearly as prevalent or structured as today.78 Therefore,
many sections of the statute are outdated as applied to managed
care. 79 ERISA preemption is not an appropriate defense in
negligence cases against HMOs. When it created ERISA,
Congress intended to protect employees and guarantee that they
receive the medical benefits they deserve.80 When HMOs are
allowed to use ERISA as a defense, Congress's intent to provide
employees with appropriate benefits is defeated. 8' The
legislature should therefore update ERISA and redefine the
preemption defense so that it is used only in the
appropriate circumstances. 8
2
B. Non-Preempted Tort Claims
Although some jurisdictions interpret ERISA broadly, there
has been some movement by courts towards a narrower
interpretation of ERISA preemption.8 3 Courts that narrowly
interpret ERISA have recognized the importance of adhering to
the traditionally-held presumption against preemption.
8 4
restrict options in the method of administration of these plans).
78 See Jane M. Mulcahy, Comment, The ERISA Preemption Question: Why
Some HMO Members Are Dying for Congress to Amend ERISA, 82 MARQ. L. REV.
877, 899 (1999) ("Congress probably did not foresee that HMOs would run the whole
show, including the doctors and the hospitals, which allows them to insulate the
whole medical spectrum by invoking ERISA preemption."); Stoeckl, supra note 3, at
408 (noting that Congress could not have predicted how managed care would evolve
when it enacted the ERISA statute).
79 See Stoeckl, supra note 3, at 408.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See Alexandra E. Trinkoff, Court Permits Malpractice Suit Against New York
HMO, 6 No. 1 N.Y. Health L. Update 2 (Mar. 1999) (recognizing that the
preemption defense is appropriate in circumstances where HMOs act as
administrators, making determinations regarding treatment coverage under health
plans); Julie M Locke, Note, The ERISA Amendment: A Prescription to Sue MCOs
for Wrongful Treatment Decisions, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1027, 1040 (1999) (noting that
ERISA preemption is acceptable where state laws "impose[] unacceptable burdens
on a plan, such as mandating benefit structures or their administration, or provid[e]
alternate enforcement mechanisms") (citing New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657-59, 661 (1995)).
83 See Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 780 (noting that some federal courts have
looked to Congress's intent in enacting ERISA instead of the language of ERISA in
evaluating claims against managed care entities).
84 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655; see also Northern Group Servs., Inc. v. Auto
Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 91 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that there is a strong
presumption that Congress's intent was not to preempt state governance).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [74:209
Specifically, the Third Circuit's decision reversing the lower
court's preemption holding in both Dukes v. United States Health
Care8 5 and Visconti v. United States Health Care86 demonstrates
that ERISA preemption should not be applied to claims involving
the quality of care provided by lIMOs. 87 Courts view quality of
care claims as being unrelated or indirectly related to ERISA
employee benefit plans.88
C. Independent Benefit Reviews: The Argument for Non-
Preemption
The court in Corporate Health Insurance should have
determined that the Act's provision for independent reviews of
adverse benefit decisions involved the quality of health care, not
the quantity and administration of employee benefits.
Furthermore, the court should have adopted the approach of
Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hospital,89 in which the court
refused to preempt a claim alleging a denial of timely approval
for an ultrasound test.90 The Kampmeier court, citing Dukes,
found that the untimeliness of the approval had a direct negative
effect on the provision of quality medical services. 91
The Corporate Health Insurance court should also have
found that preemption decisions relating to independent reviews
be considered on a case-by-case basis. It appears that a broad
preemption of this section of the Act was improper because not
all adverse benefit determinations are purely administrative.
Some determinations involve denials of benefits that lead to
reduced medical treatment and substandard health care.
85 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
86 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
87 See Visconti v. United States Health Care, 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that Congress' silence concerning quality control of benefits should be
regarded as allowing state regulation in this area); see also MacDougall, supra note
1, at 903 (asserting that the Third Circuit's reversal of the lower court's ruling in
both Dukes and Visconti undermined the effect of these cases as support for
preemption in tort claims against HMOs).
88 See Easley, supra note 73, at 302; see also Dykema v. King, 959 F. Supp. 736,
741 (D. S.C. 1997) (holding that allegations of failure to timely diagnose illnesses
relate to the quality of medical care and are therefore not preempted by ERISA);
Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 118 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that claims of
failure to diagnose patient illnesses relate to the quality of medical care and are
therefore not preempted).
89 No. CivA.95-7816, 1996 WL 220979, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996).
90 See id. at *3.
91 See id. at *2-3; see also Grosso, supra note 71, at 443.
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D. Remedies Under Preempted Versus Non-Preempted Claims
For HMOs and managed care entities faced with state tort
claims, ERISA preemption is a convenient defense.9 2 The ERISA
preemption defense has an enormous impact on the results of
litigation because preemption provides HMOs with a total bar
against all state claims.93 In addition, ERISA preemption
prevents the injured plaintiff from recovering any punitive or
compensatory damages.94  Remedies under ERISA include
reinstatement in the health plan and recovery of the cost of the
denied benefit.95 In Dukes, the Third Circuit distinguished
between the quality and the quantity of benefits to determine
preemption. The Dukes court noted, however, that ambiguity
can be encountered when making this decision and
acknowledged that this ambiguity tends to prevent the most
severely injured plaintiffs from obtaining proper redress, leaving
them without a remedy for their injuries.96 The quality of health
care may thus decline as a result of HMOs relying on the
preemption provision because the threat of tort liability as a
deterrent is eliminated.97
92 See Otterson, supra note 3, at 808 (stating that HMOs and managed care
entities depend on "ERISA as a defense against... claim[s] because of its
significant impact on the outcome of the litigation").
93 See id. (stating that, in addition to a comprehensive bar to state claims,
ERISA permits HMOs to remove the action to federal court).
94 See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 138 (1985)
(reversing circuit court of appeals' judgment, which held that ERISA did not bar
award of compensatory and punitive damages); Otterson, supra note 3, at 808-09
(noting that ERISA does not allow awards of "punitive or extracontractual
compensatory damages").
95 See Otterson, supra note 3, at 809; Stoeckl, supra note 3, at 395 (stating that
ERISA does not provide recovery for pain and suffering, lost wages, or medical
expenses that may be incurred in the future).
96 See Dukes v. United States Health Care, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir.
1995). The Dukes court stated=
There well may be cases in which the quality of a patient's medical care...
will be so low that the treatment received... will not qualify as health
care at all. In such a case, it well may be appropriate to conclude that the
plan participant... has been denied benefits due under the plan.
Id.
97 See Natalie Zeliner, Comment, Duking It Out: Beating the Complete
Preemption of ERISA Under Dukes v. United States HealthCare, Inc., 14 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 925, 948 (1998) (explaining that the preemption doctrine has eliminated tort
claims against employee IMO plans, resulting in a decline in the quality of health
care because managed care entities are less concerned about their actions).
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II. IMPACT OF THE TEXAS ACT
A. The First Texas Case Brought Under the Texas Act
The Texas legislature, concerned about the reduced
accountability of HMOs for their negligent acts, passed the Act
to allow malpractice claims to be made directly against HMOs.98
As a result of the court's holding in Corporate Health Insurance,
the first case was brought under the Act alleging negligence by
an HMO. In Plocica v. NYLCare of Texas, Inc.,99 the plaintiff
was a sixty-eight year old man with a history of depression. 100
He was admitted to a hospital after an overdose and remained
hospitalized until the defendant, NYLCare, and a health plan
physician demanded that the plaintiff be discharged-against
the approval of his physician, who diagnosed him as medically
unstable.1 1  On the evening after he was discharged, the
plaintiff committed suicide by ingesting a half-gallon of anti-
freeze. 102
The plaintiffs family brought suit under section 88.001 of
the Act,103 claiming that his HMO failed to provide the "degree of
care that a ... health maintenance organization... of ordinary
prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances."10 4
In response, the defendants filed a notice of removal to the
federal district court, claiming that the plaintiffs complaint
alleged damages caused by the denial of benefits under the
Medicare program.10 5 In turn, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
remand, denying any claim for benefits under the Medicare
Act. 0 6 The plaintiff asserted that, since the claims sought
damages for the substandard quality of health care provided by
the HMO rather than "payment or reimbursement for any
98 See Otterson, supra note 3, at 821 (noting that on May 22, 1997, Texas
enacted a statute allowing negligence claims to be brought against HMOs, making
it the first state to enact such a statute).
99 43 F. Supp. 2d 658 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
100 See id. at 662.
101 See id.
102 See id. at 662-63.
103 See id. at 663.
104 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(10) (West Supp. 1999).
105 See Plocica v. NYL Care of Texas, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 658, 660 (N.D. Tex.
1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1994) (barring federal question jurisdiction for
claims "arising under" the Social Security Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1994) (making §
405(h) of the Social Security Act applicable to the Medicare Act).
106 See Plocica, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
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allegedly denied benefit,"10 7 the Medicare Act's preemption
provision was not applicable. Rather, the court, finding that a
reimbursement remedy would be futile because Mr. Plocica was
deceased, 03 held that the plaintiffs claims were "based in tort
against defendants for their allegedly tortious conduct in the
inadequate quality of care and treatment of [the decedent]."109
The implications of this case are substantial because it holds
HMOs and managed care entities liable for substandard health
care decisions that lead to the injury or the death of health plan
holders. 10
B. Jurisdictions Considering Statutes Similar to the Texas Act
Many other jurisdictions have passed or are considering
enacting statutes similar to the Act. For example, Missouri has
passed a managed care law that permits suits against HIOs for
medical malpractice."' Under the Missouri statute, an HIO is
a "health care provider"112 and therefore subject to liability for
"making negligent medical decisions."113  Statutes recently
enacted in California 14 and Georgia 15 also allow for suits
107 Id. at 664.
108 See id. at 663-64.
109 Id. at 664.
110 Since Plocica, federal courts reviewing motions to remand state tort claims
on the basis of ERISA preemption have come to differing conclusions. Compare In re
United States HealthCare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
ERISA did not preempt state negligence claim that an HMO's policy of
presumptively discharging newborns after 24 hours was implemented without due
care for the health and safety of the newborn), and Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans,
Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) (afffiming district court's order to remand
negligence claims against HMO for doctor's failure to diagnose patient's heart
defect, resulting in death, upon a finding that plaintiffs claims "relate to the
regulation of health care-an area of traditional state regulation"), with Hull v.
Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that ERISA preempts claim of
negligence against HMO for physician's decision to deny one kind of stress test in
favor of another because such claim "rests on the denial of benefits," not medical
malpractice), and Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1999) (affirming dismissal of a complaint alleging negligence by HMO in denying
patient's request for placement in a psychiatric facility of her choice as a complaint
of improper claims processing, which, although "quasi-medical in nature," is
preempted by ERISA).
111 See MO. ANN. STAT., §§ 538.205-538.230 (West Supp. 2000).
112 Id. at § 538.205(4).
113 Locke, supra note 82, at 1044; see also Stoeckl, supra note 3, at 407 (stating
that the Missouri law imposes iMO liability for "poor medical outcomes").
114 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(a) (Deering Supp. 1999) (imposing a duty of
"ordinary care" on managed care entities providing services on or after
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against HMOs. In addition, Georgia law allows an individual to
appeal an HMO's adverse benefits decision to an independent
body,116 as do Connecticut and Arizona law. 117 The New York
State legislature has passed a managed care law that allows for
independent review of HMO decisions 18 and is also considering
a law that would allow medical malpractice suits to be brought
against HMOs. 119
Other states have simply chosen to regulate managed care
entities more closely. Nevada's managed care statute120 focuses
on the costs of health care and the effect of those costs on the
availability and quality of treatment. 121 Colorado has passed a
law setting standards for the quality of care provided by
managed care entities.122
As HMOs continue to become more widespread, states are
likely to continue enacting legislation that holds HMOs liable for
providing substandard medical care. Despite such laws,
however, HMOs may still be able to avoid liability by seeking
preemption under the ERISA statute.123 As long as ERISA
continues to be interpreted broadly without intervention by
Congress, health care consumers may face maximized medical
care costs with minimized health care quality. 24
January 1, 2001).
115 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-48(a) (Supp. 1999) (imposing a duty of "ordinary
diligence" on managed care entities and providing for tort relief for breach of such
duty without punitive damages).
116 See id. § 33-20A-32.
117 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-478n (West Supp. 1999) (providing an
appeal to an "impartial health entit[y] to provide for medical review" of the HMO's
decision after the internal appeal process is exhausted); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-
2537 (West Supp. 1999) (establishing specific "external independent review"
procedures); see also Michael Higgins, Increased Exposure for HMOs, A.BA. J.,
Sept. 1997, at 24 (surveying various state laws relating to stricter controls over
HMOs).
118 See Locke, supra note 82, at 1044 (stating that the New York law "gives
customers the right to ask for an independent review if they believe their claims for
service were wrongly denied").
119 See Higgins, supra note 117, at 24.
120 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 695G (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999).
121 See Stoeckl, supra note 3, at 407.
122 See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-16-701 to 10-16-708 (1999); see also Stoeckl,
supra note 3, at 407.
123 See Locke, supra note 82, at 1044 (noting that it is unclear whether IMOs
will be held liable under these statutes while ERISA preemption exists); Stoeckl,
supra note 3, at 408 (noting that ERISA would allow HMOs and managed care
entities to "remain insulated from liability").
124 See Grosso, supra note 71, at 433 (noting that health care consumers may
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CONCLUSION
The Texas law has the potential to affect greatly the status
of health care in the United States today. Congress, however,
must address issues surrounding ERISA preemption because
most health care consumers are members of health plans that
are offered through their employers as employee benefit plans.
As a result, HMOs and managed care entities seek shelter under
the ERISA preemption provision. They do not strive to improve
the quality of care they provide because they are free from the
fear of potential litigation. It is imperative that Congress enact
legislation to narrow the interpretation of the preemption
provision and recognize that a denial of benefits might be
equivalent to substandard health care. It is only by this course
of action that health care consumers and their families will avoid
the potentially devastating effects and unnecessary anguish
caused by the denial of benefits that limits medical
intervention-intervention that could ease a person's suffering
or even cure the disease that causes it.
become victims of negligent care by managed care entities resulting from cost-
containment measures, and that health care consumers may not be able to obtain
relief for their injuries due to ERISA preemption).
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